卓越考研

对外经济贸易大学

2009年硕士学位研究生入学考试初试试题

考试科目：851 法学专业理论

（请注意：此考卷适用于报考法学理论、宪法学与行政法学、民

商法学、诉讼法学、经济法学专业的考生）

一  中文试题部分（共100分）

（一）简答题（共6道小题，每题5分，共30分）

1.  人权和公民权有何区别？

2.  什么事选举权平等原则？

3.  据我国商业银行法，商业银行的经营原则是什么？如何实现对存款人的保护？

4.  根据我国反不正当竞争法，侵犯商业秘密的行为表现有哪些？

5.  我国产品质量法对产品质量的要求是什么？

（二）法条评析（共3道小题，每小题5分，共15分）

1.  请分析《宪法》第七十五：“全国人民代表大会代表在全国人民代表大会各种会议上的发言和表决，不受法律追究。”

2.  请评析增值税暂行条例第10条：“下列项目的进项税额不得从销项税额中抵扣：（1）用于非增值税应税项目、免征增值税项目、集体福利或者个人消费的购进货物或者应税劳务；（2）非正常损失的购进货物及相关的应税劳务；（3）非正常损失的在产品、产成品所耗用的购进货物或者应税劳务；（4）国务院财政、税务主管部门规定的纳税人自用消费品；（5）本条第（1）项至第（4）项规定的货物的运输费用和销售免税货物的运输费用。”

3.  评析《民事诉讼法》第二百一十五条，“申请执行的期间为二年。申请执行时效的中止、中断，适用法律有关诉讼时效中止、中断的规定。”

（三）案例分析题（10分）

钱某是民营企业家，并开办了一家自己的工厂甲厂，2001年甲厂与乙公司签订了一份客车买卖合同，约定由甲厂向乙公司提供客车30台，乙公司向甲厂支付货款600万元。甲厂履行了合同，乙公司却拒不支付货款。甲厂于2002年6月20日向辽宁省某市中级人民法院提起诉讼，要求乙公司偿还欠款本息650万元。

2003年5月5日该中级人民法院一审判决驳回原告诉讼请求。甲厂不服，向辽宁省高级法院上诉。二审法院发现，甲厂除坚持在一审中的诉讼请求外，还要求被上诉人偿还其他欠款80万元。被上诉人在答辩期间提起反诉，要求上诉人对自己进行赔偿。在二审的审判过程中，上诉人提起了新的证据，法院经审查认为该证据足以推翻一审判决，于是未经开庭迳行裁定将该案发回重审。问题：

1.  二审法院对于甲厂增加的诉讼请求应当如何处理？（5分）

2.  本案中法院迳行裁定将案件发回重审是否正确？（5分）

（四）论述题（共3道小题，每题15分，共45分）

1.  请阐述宪法保障公民言论自由的重要意义。

2.  论我国反垄断法的立法宗旨。

3.  论当事人平等地享有诉讼权利和义务。

二  英文题（共3道小题，共50分，用中文回答）

1.  翻译下文并简述宪法作此规定的重要意义。（10分）

Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. It is the inviolable duty of all Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan, to accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland.

2.  翻译下文（15分）

Non-litigative dispute resolution techniques are the future of dispute resolution. Long perceived as applicable only to neighborhood conflicts, or perhaps labor negotiations, conscientious attorneys and business managers now recognize creative dispute resolution processes are becoming business’ processes of choice. More than sixty percent of the Fortune500 corporations have pledged to use non-litigative dispute resolution processes. Disputing parties are recognizing the perils of litigation, not only because it is expensive, public, uncertain and it denies the parties control in resolving their conflict, it also, takes a terrible human toll. As Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand said, “As litigant, I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything short of sickness and death.”

3.  阅读以下判决书（节选），并回答问题。（25分）

It cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.“ Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are formed; And although the empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical. As the rule would proscribe a significant amount of precompetitive conduct, these agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation.

Defendant contends, nonetheless, that vertical price restraints should be per se unlawful because of the administrative convenience of per se rules. That argument suggests per se illegality is the rule rather than the exception. This misinterprets our antitrust law. Per se rules may decrease administrative costs, but that is only part of the equation. Those rules can be counterproductive. They can increase the total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage. They also may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices. The Court has thus explained that administrative “advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules,” and has relegated their use to restraints that are “manifestly anticompetitive.” Were the Court now to conclude that vertical price restraints should be per se illegal based on administrative costs, we would undermine, if not overrule, the traditional “demanding standards” for adopting per se rules. Any possible reduction in administrative costs cannot alone justify the per se rule.

Defendant also argues the per se rule is justified because a vertical price restraint can lead to higher prices for the manufacturer’s goods. Defendant is mistaken in relying on pricing effects absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct. For, as has been indicated already, the antitrust laws are designed primarily to protect interbrand competition, from which lower prices can later result. The Court, moreover, has evaluated other vertical restraints under the rule of reason even though prices can be increased in the course of promoting procompetitive effects. And resale price maintenance may reduce prices if manufacturers have resorted to costlier alternatives of controlling resale prices that are not per se unlawful.

Defendant’s argument, furthermore, overlooks that, in general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins. The difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the manufacturer’s cost of distribution, which, like any other cost, the manufacturer usually desires to minimize. A manufacturer has no incentive to overcompensate retailers with unjustified margins. The retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from higher retail prices. The manufacturer often loses; interbrand competition reduces its competitiveness and market share because consumers will “substitute a different brand of the same product.” As a general matter, therefore, a single manufacturer will desire to set minimum resale prices only if the “increase in demand resulting from enhanced service . . . will more than offset a negative impact on demand of a higher retail price.”

The implications of respondent’s position are far reaching. Many decisions a manufacturer makes and carries out through concerted action can lead to higher prices. A manufacturer might, for example, contract with different suppliers to obtain better inputs that improve product quality. Or it might hire an advertising agency to promote awareness of its goods. Yet no one would think these actions violate the Sherman Act because they lead to higher prices. The antitrust laws do not require manufacturers to produce generic goods that consumers do not know about or want. The manufacturer strives to improve its product quality or to promote its brand because it believes this conduct will lead to increased demand despite higher prices. The same can hold true for resale price maintenance.

The rule of reason is designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market. This standard principle applies to vertical price restraints. A party alleging injury from a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices will have, as a general matter, the information and resources available to show the existence of the agreement and its scope of operation. As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we think that the rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would be the appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints.

1.     适用本身违法原则(per se illegality)对于司法效率有何正面作用？这种作用又会产生什么样的反面效果？（8分）

2.     厂商与消费者在零售价格这个问题上存在什么样的关系？（5分）

3.     维持转售价格与做广告这两种行为之间有何共同点？（5分）

4.     对于维持转售价格的案件，应当如何适用合理原则（the rule of reason）（7分）？